The gapWe do not know which anti-phishing interventions, if any, measurably reduce compromise in real organisations over time. Most studies report positive effects under controlled conditions (Prümmer et al., 2024), while the largest field studies find that annual and embedded training make little difference, or can even increase susceptibility (Ho et al., 2025; Lain et al., 2022), and the mechanisms behind these results are only beginning to be tested (Lain et al., 2024).
Evidence gap (laboratory versus field)Methodological gapPractical-knowledge gapTheoretical gap
The problem
Phishing uses deceptive messages to trick people into clicking links, opening attachments or giving away credentials. It is the most prevalent type of breach or attack reported by UK businesses (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, 2026) and the most frequently reported crime type to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025).
Why it happens
Attackers target human attention rather than technical flaws. Field evidence suggests that people who click are often distracted rather than uninformed, and that they rarely read training material (Lain et al., 2024; UC San Diego, 2025). Lure design matters too: click rates in one study ranged from under 2% to over 30% depending on the message (UC San Diego, 2025).
Where it is felt most
Every sector that uses email is exposed. Healthcare is a notable case, as one of the largest field studies was run in a university health system (Ho et al., 2025). Business email compromise, which often begins with phishing-style deception, causes the second-highest reported losses in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025).
How big is the problem
- 43%of UK businesses (about 612,000) identified a cyber breach or attack in the last 12 months; phishing was the most prevalent type, experienced by 38% of businesses (CSBS 2025/2026) (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, 2026)
- 193,407phishing and spoofing complaints to the FBI IC3 in 2024, the highest of any crime type (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025)
- US$2.77 billionreported losses from 21,442 business email compromise complaints, United States, 2024 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025)
- About 2%reduction in clicking attributed to embedded training among 19,500 employees over eight months (UC San Diego, 2025)
Why it is worth solving
Organisations spend time and money on phishing training, often because policies or insurers expect it. If commonly deployed programmes add little protection (Ho et al., 2025), that effort could be redirected to measures that work, such as easy reporting and technical controls (Lain et al., 2022).
For science, the question tests how far findings from controlled studies transfer to real behaviour at work. Answering it would improve not only phishing defence but the evaluation of security interventions more generally (Prümmer et al., 2024).
Why so much research has not solved it
Phishing training is one of the most studied topics in usable security. The trouble is where and how most of that research is done. A systematic review of 142 papers found that most report benefits, yet most also relied on pre-test and post-test designs with small samples, often of students rather than employees, and few measured whether effects lasted (Prümmer et al., 2024). Under those conditions, people know they are being tested and attend closely.
Field studies remove that advantage. In a real organisation, a phishing message arrives during a busy day. When researchers tracked more than 14,000 employees for 15 months, embedded training did not deliver the expected protection and showed side effects that could raise susceptibility (Lain et al., 2022). In a health system with 19,500 employees, annual training was not linked to fewer failures, and many employees closed training pages without reading them (UC San Diego, 2025; Ho et al., 2025).
- Outcome mismatch: studies measure clicks on simulations, while organisations care about real compromise.
- Attention, not knowledge: employees often already know the warning signs (Lain et al., 2024).
- Lure variation: results depend heavily on which message is sent (UC San Diego, 2025).
- Access: field data sit inside organisations and require trust, legal agreements and ethics approval.
Where a doctoral project can add value
A doctorate can contribute without promising to end phishing. One route is explanatory: testing why laboratory and field results diverge, for example by running the same intervention in both settings. A second is design-led: evaluating alternatives to training, such as deterrent warnings or reporting tools, which field evidence suggests may matter more (Lain et al., 2022; Lain et al., 2024). A third is measurement: linking simulation results to real incidents so that future studies use outcomes that matter.
Realistic doctoral angles on phishing defence| Angle | Typical data | Main skill |
|---|
| Laboratory versus field comparison | Simulation results in two settings | Experimental design |
| Alternatives to training | Reporting and warning logs | Field experiments, statistics |
| Outcome validation | Simulation, incident and detection records | Log analysis, data linkage |
| Employee experience | Interviews and surveys | Qualitative or mixed methods |
Whatever the angle, treat staff fairly. Studies that blame individuals can damage security culture, while those that improve systems benefit everyone.