Why review this paper
For about fifteen years the World Bank's Doing Business report ranked almost every economy on the ease of starting and running a firm. Governments set targets to climb it, donors used it to plan projects and investors read it. A doctoral researcher interested in rankings, regulation or trade will meet the index quickly, and will also meet a large grey literature that treats the rank as a direct measure of the business climate.
The most cited scholarly account of what the index actually did is Doshi et al. (2019). This review replaces it. It sets out what the paper claims, where its evidence is strong, where it is limited, and how a thesis should use it today.

The paper under review
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rush Doshi, Judith G. Kelley and Beth A. Simmons |
| Title | The power of ranking: The Ease of Doing Business indicator and global regulatory behavior |
| Journal | International Organization, 73(3), 611–643 (2019) |
| Context | Part of a journal symposium on global performance indicators introduced by Kelley and Simmons (2019) |
| Evidence types | Market share of business climate indicators; media analyses; observational data on state responses; an experiment with US portfolio managers; a case study of India |
| Main claim | The World Bank shaped business regulation worldwide through public ranking, without a formal regulatory mandate |
What the authors argue and find
The starting puzzle is one of authority. The World Bank has no power to require any country to change its company law, yet many governments reformed business regulation in ways the index rewarded. The authors argue that the ranking itself was the mechanism. By grading states publicly and repeatedly, it created reputational pressure that officials and politicians felt and acted on (Doshi et al., 2019).
This argument follows the symposium's general account of global performance indicators. Kelley and Simmons (2019) propose that such indicators gain influence by framing an issue, by lending authority to their creators and by inviting repeated comparisons that make governments worry about their reputations. Doing Business is presented as a leading example.
The paper then assembles several kinds of evidence. It shows that the index held a dominant position among business climate indicators. Media analyses and observational data indicate that states responded to their rankings, and that some restructured their bureaucracies to manage the indicator, for example by creating units to coordinate reforms. An experiment with US portfolio managers tests whether rank information shifts investor sentiment, which would give governments a material reason to care. Finally, a case study of India traces a multiyear effort to climb the ranking, including the creation of rankings of Indian states (Doshi et al., 2019).
The authors' conclusion is that converging evidence from different methods shows how an international organisation can govern through information. In later work the same scholars describe rankings as "governance by other means": systems that inform audiences and spur competition among states rather than legislating directly (Kelley & Simmons, 2021).
Strengths
- A clear mechanism. The paper explains why a ranking without legal force can change behaviour, and the explanation can be tested in other settings (Kelley & Simmons, 2019).
- Triangulation. Media data, observational patterns, an experiment and a case study each have weaknesses, but they point in the same direction. A reader does not have to accept any single method alone.
- An experimental test of the audience. Asking whether professional investors react to rank information addresses the step that the reputational argument most needs.
- Attention to bureaucracy. Showing that governments built units to manage an indicator is concrete evidence that a ranking can reshape administration, not just rhetoric.
Limitations and methodological issues
What the index measured. Doing Business recorded formal rules, collected through questionnaires sent to local experts, and usually described the largest business city. It focused on the time and cost of compliance and assumed that firms know the procedures. The World Bank's own evaluators listed these features, noted that small data revisions could change rankings, and warned that frequent changes of method reduced the series' value for research (Independent Evaluation Group, 2021). Responses to the ranking may therefore be responses to the rules on paper, which is consistent with the paper's argument but limits any claim about the real business environment.
Selection into reform. Governments that chose to chase the ranking were not a random sample. Leadership changes, aid programmes and wider liberalisation could drive both reform and attention to the index. The evaluators also stressed that the report did not track the effects of reforms and that correlations do not justify causal claims (Independent Evaluation Group, 2021). Observational evidence of responsiveness is therefore suggestive rather than decisive.
From sentiment to behaviour. An experiment can show that rank information changes stated preferences. It cannot show how much the ranking moved actual capital flows, which is the outcome most trade and investment dissertations care about.
One deep case. India is an important case, but a country that made climbing the ranking a public goal is close to a best case for the theory. Cases where governments ignored the index would test it harder.
The index after 2021. In September 2021 the World Bank discontinued Doing Business after an investigation into data irregularities in recent editions, and it has since developed a successor assessment, Business Ready (B-READY). This does not undermine the paper's finding that the ranking was powerful. It strengthens a related concern: an indicator with that much influence attracts pressure on the people who produce it, a risk also documented for university rankings (Meho, 2025).
How the paper sits in the wider literature
The paper belongs to two literatures. In international relations it is a central study of global performance indicators, alongside the symposium introduction (Kelley & Simmons, 2019) and later theoretical work on rankings as regulatory systems (Kelley & Simmons, 2021). In economics, the index grew out of a programme that measured legal and regulatory institutions across countries and related them to economic outcomes; that programme is reviewed by La Porta et al. (2008), which a thesis should read to understand where the indicators came from and the critiques they attracted.
A third, useful comparison is the study of academic rankings. Management scholars have shown how rankings can distort the behaviour of the institutions they rank (Adler & Harzing, 2009), and recent bibliometric work documents anomalies consistent with gaming of university league tables (Meho, 2025). The same questions apply to country rankings: what is rewarded, what is neglected and who has an incentive to manipulate the numbers.
Finally, a thesis on rankings and trade must handle the trade literature carefully. A classic border-effect finding is sometimes misquoted as a comparison between Canadian "counties". The comparison was between trade among Canadian provinces and trade between provinces and US states of similar size and distance, and later work estimated much smaller effects. Read the original studies before citing a number from them.
Worked example: a design that tests the trade question (illustrative)
Suppose a master's or doctoral student wants to ask whether improving a country's rank increased its exports. The illustrative plan below shows how the paper's limits translate into design choices. No results are implied.
- Define the treatment precisely. Use the dates on which each edition was published and the size of each country's change in rank, rather than the rank level.
- Separate rule changes from rank changes. A rank can move because other countries changed or because the method changed (Independent Evaluation Group, 2021). Code these separately so the analysis can ask whether information or reform drives any effect.
- Choose an identification strategy. An event-study or difference-in-differences design compares countries before and after a rank change with similar countries whose rank did not change, and checks pre-trends (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
- Test sensitivity. Report how results change with alternative controls, samples and time windows, so the conclusion does not depend on one specification (Leamer, 1983).
- State the scope. Results apply to the period of the index (to 2020) and to formal rules; say so plainly in the discussion.
What the paper can and cannot support
| Claim in your thesis | Supported by the paper? | What else you need |
|---|---|---|
| The World Bank influenced regulatory reform through the ranking | Yes, with converging evidence | Acknowledge selection into reform |
| Governments created units to manage their rank | Yes, as reported | Country examples from primary sources |
| Investors respond to rank information | Partly: stated responses in an experiment | Evidence on actual flows |
| A better rank increased trade or investment | No | Your own causal design and trade data |
| The index measured the real business environment | No | Measures of practice, such as firm surveys |
Implications for doctoral researchers and common mistakes
Cite the paper for what it shows: that public ranking gave an international organisation real influence over national regulation. Use it to motivate questions about measurement, gaming and the politics of indicators. Do not cite it as evidence that ranking-driven reforms improved trade or growth. Related pages: a critical review of a citation ranking study, writing the literature review chapter and economic history in the economics PhD.
Common mistakes
- Treating the Doing Business rank as a measure of how easy business really is.
- Citing the index as current without saying it was discontinued in 2021.
- Using rank levels across editions without checking for changes of method.
- Inferring causation from a correlation between rank and investment.
- Quoting famous trade findings second-hand, with the wrong units or comparison.
- Relying on essay samples or summaries instead of the published paper.
Key takeaways
- Doshi, Kelley and Simmons show that a public ranking gave the World Bank real influence over national business regulation (Doshi et al., 2019).
- Indicators work through framing, authority and repeated comparison that creates reputational pressure (Kelley & Simmons, 2019; Kelley & Simmons, 2021).
- The index measured formal rules with known validity problems, so rank changes are not changes in the real business climate (Independent Evaluation Group, 2021).
- The paper does not estimate effects on trade; a thesis that asks that question needs its own causal design (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
- Rankings with high stakes invite gaming, a lesson shared with academic league tables (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Meho, 2025).
